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Due Diligence to Prevent Foreseeable Harm: The 
International Human Rights Agenda on Civilian Gun 
Violence 
Barbara A. Frey * 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The international human rights community is paying increasing 
attention to the adverse impacts of gun violence on the entire spectrum of 
human rights.  Growing consciousness of the harm caused by civilian 
firearms violence, in particular, is leading intergovernmental organizations 
to consider the obligations of States under international human rights law 
regarding civilian acquisition, possession, and use of firearms.  In practice, 
there is significant international consensus about the measures 
governments should take to exercise effective control over the possession 
and use of firearms. A large majority of governments already regulate 
civilian acquisition of firearms through licensing requirements to prevent 
their availability from persons most likely to misuse them. The United 
States remains an outlier on universal licensing requirements and opposes 
international human rights oversight of civilian acquisition, possession or 
use of firearms. Despite the U.S. opposition, the international community 
is moving cautiously toward the development of human rights standards to 
prevent civilian gun violence.   
This article will explain how regulation of firearms came to be part of 
the United Nations’ human rights agenda. First, the article will revisit the 
2002-06 study and the 2006 principles on firearms and human rights 
endorsed by the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, especially as this work related to the due diligence 
obligation of States to prevent human rights violations committed by 
civilians.  The analysis will then turn to recent normative developments on 
gun violence in the U.N. Human Rights Council and Human Rights 
Committee and conclude with a brief analysis of the path ahead on 
 
* Barbara A. Frey is Senior Lecturer in the Institute for Global Studies at the University of 
Minnesota and directs the Human Rights Program. She was the Special Rapporteur on human rights 
violations committed with small arms and light weapons for the United Nations Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights from 2003-06. She received her J.D. from the 
University of Wisconsin Law School (1982) and B.A. from the University of Notre Dame (1978).   
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international standards regarding civilian acquisition, possession, and 
misuse of firearms.    
 
I. SUB-COMMISSION STUDY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND SMALL 
ARMS 
 
In 2002, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (“Sub-Commission”) appointed the author1 to 
prepare a comprehensive study on the prevention of human rights 
violations committed with small arms and light weapons.2 The Sub-
Commission’s study represented an initial step in examining the human 
rights implications of a post-Cold War world flooded by hundreds of 
millions of small arms and light weapons3 that caused hundreds of 
thousands of deaths each year.4  Small arms and light weapons moved to 
the center of the security and development agendas in the 1990s when it 
became clear that they were the tools of choice in complex civil wars and 
insurgencies, terrorism, and criminal violence.5 The Sub-Commission’s 
study emphasized the need to address human security in addition to 
national security. The resolution authorizing the study asserted “the 
protection of human rights must be central to the development of further 
principles and norms regarding the transfer and misuse of small arms and 
light weapons and that human rights are not being given adequate 
 
1.  Barbara A. Frey was the U.S. Alternate Member of the Sub-Commission from 2000-03 and thus 
eligible to undertake a study for the body. See Faculty & Staff Directory, UNIV. OF MINN., 
https://cla.umn.edu/about/directory/profile/freyx001 (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
2. U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights, The Prevention of Human Rights Violations Caused 
by the Availability and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2002/25 (Aug. 14, 2002). For U.N. purposes small arms are defined as weapons 
designed for personal use and light weapons are designed for use by several persons acting as a crew. 
U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
A/52/298, (Aug. 27, 1997).  
3. See U.N. Gen. Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, ¶¶ 24–
27, U.N. Doc. A/52/298, (Aug. 27, 1997). 
4. See Barbara Frey, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
The Question of Trade, Carrying and Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Norms, ¶¶ 6, 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39 (May 30, 2002) 
[hereinafter Frey Working Paper]. 
5.  See, e.g., U.N. Gen. Assembly, Foreword by the Secretary-General to the Report of the Panel 
of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, U.N. Doc. A/52/298, annex (Aug. 27, 1997). 
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consideration in other contexts.”6  
The timing of the Sub-Commission’s study coincided with the United 
Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All Its Aspects, a parallel process in the General Assembly to address 
the proliferation of small arms globally. The formal conference process 
culminated in a three-week diplomatic conference in July 2001 at the New 
York headquarters that achieved a political consensus by which States 
committed to establish adequate national controls on manufacture, 
acquisition and transfer of small arms and light weapons.7 The Programme 
of Action focused on preventing illegal transfer–firearms that ended up in 
the hands of unauthorized non-state actors—and not on the harm caused 
by domestically sanctioned possession or use.  At the Small Arms 
Conference, States focused their attention on the threat of small arms to 
their own national security, not on the ways that States themselves were 
carrying out violations with firearms or acquiescing in firearms-related 
violence by private actors.8 As such, the Conference did not reach 
consensus on a norm that prohibited the use of firearms to violate human 
rights.9 Joost Hiltermann of Human Rights Watch observed at the time, 
“[t]he omission of human rights from the U.N. Conference on Small Arms 
and the resulting Programme of Action should be seen as a deliberate 
effort by states to shirk their responsibility as states for the proliferation 
and misuse of weapons. Governments like to blame others for this 
problem: arms traffickers, brokers, rebels, but rarely themselves.”10 
Keeping in mind the developments in the General Assembly, the Sub-
Commission’s study undertook to address this human rights gap regarding 
firearms.  The Sub-Commission’s rapporteur employed a three-part human 
 
6.  U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights, supra note 2. 
7.  See Rep. of the U.N. Conf. on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.192/195 (Jul. 9–20, 2001). 
8.  Edward J. Laurance, Shaping Global Public Policy on Small Arms: After the UN Conference, 9 
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 193, 198-99 (2002). 
9.  Id. at 197. 
10.  Joost Hiltermann, Exec. Dir. Of the Arms Div. of Human Rights Watch, The UN Conference 
on Small Arms: Diplomatic Success, Humanitarian Failure, Remarks at Humanitarian Coalition on 
Small Arms Meeting (Nov. 18–20, 2001), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C2EF49C121082011C1256C40002C4DCA-
iansa-small-nov01.htm#_Toc12165138. 
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rights analysis regarding small arms: (1) their misuse by State agents, (2) 
their misuse by armed individuals and groups when the State fails to 
exercise due diligence, and (3) their transfer with knowledge that they are 
likely to be used to commit serious violations of international human 
rights law.11 The study noted that human rights impacts of firearms were 
apparent and ubiquitous. Guns were the tools used to facilitate an entire 
range of human rights violations, including arbitrary executions, sexual 
assault, enforced disappearance, torture, forced displacement, and forced 
recruitment of children soldiers.12 Communities awash in guns also 
suffered violations of economic and social rights; easy access to firearms 
contributed to the collapse of economic productivity, erosion of social 
services and the disintegration of traditional social bonds.13 Yet, until the 
Sub-Commission’s study, few human rights organizations had 
documented the role of guns in these violations14 and the United Nations’ 
human rights bodies had not explicitly considered how human rights law 
should apply to the availability and misuse of small arms and light 
weapons. 
A key argument for a human rights diagnosis of small arms and light 
weapons was that the gun itself was a multiplier of human rights 
violations. The rapporteur explained the multiplier effect in her 
preliminary report to the Sub-Commission, pointing out, “[a] single 
weapon, misused, can change the fate of an individual, a family, or even 
an entire community. A flood of small arms can shift the entire balance of 
power in a community, leading to a lack of personal security that destroys 
the rule of law.”15 The rapporteur noted that the presence of a weapon 
could transform the scale and the pace of human rights violations. Given 
technological developments in the field, the rapporteur explained firearms 
 
11.  Barbara Frey (Special Rapporteur), Preliminary Rep. on the Prevention of Human Rights 
Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 
(June 25, 2003) [hereinafter Preliminary Report]. 
12.  Frey Working Paper, supra note 4, ¶¶ 7, 8. 
13.  Preliminary Report, supra note 11, ¶ ¶ 12, 13, 34. 
14.  See generally, Int’l Action Network on Small Arms, Implementation of the UN Program of 
Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, at 2-4 (2017). 
15.  Preliminary Report, supra note 11, ¶ 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/8














are growing more lethal and easier to use for even unsophisticated and 
untrained users, raising further human rights concerns.16 
 
III. DUE DILIGENCE OBLIGATIONS TO PREVENT CIVILIAN 
FIREARM VIOLENCE  
 
The first two submissions by the rapporteur explored the State’s 
responsibility to prevent violations by State agents under human rights and 
humanitarian law and considered the gender implications of small arms 
availability and misuse in a human rights context.17  In 2006, the 
rapporteur’s final report analyzed, inter alia, the question of the State’s 
human rights obligations to prevent armed violence by private actors.18 In 
doing so, the report reviewed the jurisprudence of the United Nations 
human rights enforcement mechanisms on the question of the State’s due 
diligence obligations to prevent harm by non-state actors.19  The 
rapporteur found the general comments of various treaty bodies20 to be 
particularly relevant as well as the recommendations of the Special 
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions21 with 
 
16.  Id. ¶ 14. 
17.  See Preliminary Report, supra note 10; Barbara Frey (Special Rapporteur), Progress Report of 
Barbara Frey, Special Rapporteur on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37 (June 21, 2004). 
18 Barbara Frey (Special Rapporteur), Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small 
Arms and Light Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/27/Add.1 (July 27, 2006) [hereinafter Final 
Report]. 
19.  Id. ¶¶ 10 – 14. 
20.  See, e.g, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 6: Article 
6 (Right to Life), ¶ 4 (Apr. 30, 1982) (asserting that states parties should take measures not only to 
prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their 
own security forces); Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 27: 
Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), ¶ 6 (Nov. 2, 1999) (“The State party must ensure that the rights 
guaranteed in article 12 are protected not only from public but also from private interference”); Comm. 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 9 (1992) (“Under general international law and 
specific human rights covenants States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with 
due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for 
providing compensation.”) 
21.  Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Civil and Political Rights Including the Questions of 
Disappearance and Summary Executions, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53 (Mar. 8, 2006) (“States 
have a legal duty to exercise ‘due diligence’ in protecting the lives of individuals from attacks by 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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regard to prevention and punishment of violations by private actors.  
The Sub-Commission’s rapporteur on small arms drew special 
attention to the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 31 
(2004) on the nature of the general legal obligations imposed on States 
Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“Covenant”).  The Human Rights Committee interpreted the requirements 
of article 2, paragraph 1 of the Covenant to “respect and ensure” rights,22 
noting 
The positive obligations on States parties to ensure Covenant rights 
will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not 
just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against 
acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application 
between private persons or entities.23  
The Human Rights Committee had recognized that, in certain 
circumstances, a State could violate Covenant rights by “permitting or 
failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by 
private persons or entities.”24  The Human Rights Committee’s case law at 
the time,25 and its responses to the reports of States’ Parties to the 
Covenant,26 also supported an interpretation of due diligence that 
encompassed the need for reasonable firearms regulations to prevent 
 
criminals, including terrorists, armed robbers, looters and drug dealers”). 
22.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, ¶ 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
14668. 
23.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, ¶ 6, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 
2004). 
24.  Id. ¶ 8. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 195/1985, William Eduardo 
Delgado Páez v. Colombia (Aug. 23, 1990)  (finding that Colombia violated art. 9(1) when it failed to 
take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect the complainant, who reported death threats to 
military authorities, the teachers' union, the Ministry of Education and the President of Colombia.).  
25.  Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 859/1999, Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia (Mar. 25, 
2002) (finding a violation of Covenant article 6, paragraph 1, in part, because the State did not use due 
diligence in investigating who was responsible for an attempt on the complainant’s life, thus 
preventing him from living safely in Colombia.). For a case of a more recent vintage with a similar 
conclusion, see Human Rights Comm., Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1862/2009, 
Peiris v Sri Lanka (Apr. 18, 2012) (finding the complainant’s husband death was attributable to the 
State where police threatened harm and failed to take appropriate preventative action).   
26.  See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 
40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add 50 (Apr. 6, 1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/8














foreseeable harm.  
The rapporteur’s legal analysis of due diligence obligations was 
enhanced by the responses she received from governments to a 2004 
questionnaire authorized by the Commission for all U.N. member states 
regarding their laws, policies, and practices concerning firearms.27 Forty-
one states responded to the questionnaire, a relatively high response rate 
for Sub-Commission surveys.28 The rapporteur’s analysis of the responses 
paid special attention to what licensing requirements responding States 
imposed upon civilian acquisition and use of firearms. All responding 
States reported that they had licensing requirements for civilian possession 
of small arms. Among those States, however, the factors considered as a 
basis for licensing to civilians varied to some degree and responding States 
provided few details about what evidence would disqualify an individual 
from receiving a license to own a firearm. While all regulating States 
considered criminal record and age before approving a license for civilian 
possession of a firearm, slightly fewer considered the psychological 
profile (84%) or domestic abuse record (73%) of the applicant. A majority 
of States (58%) required a demonstration of technical capability as part of 
the licensing process.29 
Based on States’ practices and the U.N.’s due-diligence jurisprudence, 
the rapporteur concluded in her final report that the minimum effective 
measures States should adopt to prevent small arms violence must go 
beyond mere criminalization of acts of armed violence and include some 
level of licensing.30 While every State criminalized murder with a firearm, 
States must go further to ensure effective protection through “some 
machinery of control”,31 to prevent violations of core rights with 
 
27.  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127, at 
348 (2004); QUESTIONNAIRE ON SMALL ARMS, LIGHT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B3nSY2eu5Q9VLUh3ZHBwVnJJdVE (accessed Feb. 7, 
2019). 
28.  COUNTRY RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE, 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0B3nSY2eu5Q9VUmhxQ3pjMFVpdkE (last visited Feb. 7, 
2019). Generally a questionnaire such as this generally receives between twenty and thirty responses. 
29.  Final Report, supra note 18, at Annex 1.  
30.  Id. ¶ 16. 
31.  This concept was elaborated by the Human Rights Committee, General Comment 7, Article 7 
(Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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firearms.32  The report concluded that human rights bodies should pay 
more attention to impacts of firearms on human rights, and should 
recommend that States enforce a minimum licensing requirement designed 
to keep small arms and light weapons out of the hands of persons who 
were most likely to misuse them.33  
The rapporteur recommended that relevant human rights bodies should 
inquire about State practices on firearms as part of their evaluation of 
States’ periodic reporting.34 The rapporteur recommended that, based on 
the jurisprudence regarding due diligence, international human rights 
treaty bodies should require States to enforce a minimum licensing 
requirement designed to keep small arms and light weapons out of the 
hands of persons who are likely to misuse them.35 
Based upon the responses received to the questionnaire, the report put 
forward recommendations for minimum licensing criteria that would 
comply with due diligence obligations.  The rapporteur found that, while 
criteria for licensing varied from State to State, most licensing procedures 
considered, at a minimum: (1) age; (2) past criminal record including any 
history of interfamilial violence; (3) proof of a legitimate purpose for 
obtaining a weapon; and (4) mental fitness.  The rapporteur incorporated 
these ideas in a set of draft principles described next. 
 
IV. REVISITING THE PRINCIPLES ON FIREARMS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
During the course of the study, 2002-06, the rapporteur worked with 
members of the Sub-Commission to draft a set of model principles 
 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 7 (1994). The Human Rights 
Committee replaced General Comment 7 with General Comment 20 in 1992, but the concept of 
effective machinery of control remained central to its articulation of the State’s obligation, id. Human 
Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 20, Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or punishment), at ¶ 2 (Mar. 10, 1992) (stating “It is the duty of the 
State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as may be necessary 
against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, 
outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.”). 
32.  Final Report, supra note 18, ¶ 15. 
33.  Id. ¶ ¶ 42, 46. 
34.  Id. ¶ 16. 
35.  Id. ¶ 16-17. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/8














entitled, “Principles on the prevention of human rights violations 
committed with small arms” (“Principles”). The Principles aimed to 
provide States with a human rights framework for reviewing their small 
arms policies and practices. The Principles met a gap in international 
discussions on small arms which mainly took place in UN bodies that 
were either unfamiliar with international human rights law or chose to 
address the issues regarding small arms in a technical manner–overlooking 
the UN’s central commitment to human security, human dignity and 
human rights. The Sub-Commission endorsed the Principles in 2006 as a 
contribution to protecting the right to life, and indeed the entire spectrum 
of human rights, and transmitted them to the Human Rights Council for 
further consideration and adoption.36 The Council, in its session serving as 
the successor to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, failed to act on 
the Principles. Despite this, with their endorsement by the Sub-
Commission, the Principles constituted a soft law statement of norms that 
delineated the State’s obligations to prevent human rights violations 
committed with firearms. 
The Principles have two parts.  Part A contains nine principles 
addressing the human rights obligations regarding the use of firearms by 
State agents, and Part B contains six principles on State responsibilities 
regarding the possession and use of firearms by private actors.37  The 
document begins with the threshold legal principle, “Governments and 
State officials, especially law enforcement officials, shall not use small 
arms to violate human rights.”38  The commentary to the Principles noted 
that this general obligation on the part of State officials included an 
affirmative responsibility to use due diligence to ensure that the right to 
 
36.  U.N. Human Rights Council, Draft Report of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Res. 2006/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Sub.1/58/L.11/Add.1 (Aug. 24, 2006). 
37.  See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Progress Report Submitted by Ms. Barbara Frey, Special 
Rapporteur on the Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, Add., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37/Add.1 (June 21, 2004) (providing commentary with 
sources for the Principles); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Commission on Human Rights, Prevention of 
Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, Note by the Secretariat, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/35 (June 15, 2005) (providing revised commentary) [hereafter 
“Commission on Human Rights Report.” 
38.  Principles, supra note 37, at 8 (quoting Principle 1). 
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life, liberty, and security of the person is not violated.39 
Part A of the Principles sets forth human rights standards to guide law 
enforcement practices related to firearms. Part A draws upon other 
established principles, including the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of 
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,40 the U.N. Code of 
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,41 and the U.N. Principles on the 
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions and extends them explicitly to regulate the 
possession and use of firearms.42  The Small Arms Principles were 
intended to assist Member States in ensuring and promoting proper use of 
firearms by State agents, especially law enforcement officials, with respect 
to their unequivocal role to protect the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person,43 including: 
 
• Adopting rules and regulations on the use of force with 
firearms (principle 2);  
• Strict enforcement of those rules and regulations, including a 
clear chain of command, and punishment of violations as 
criminal offences (principle 3); 
• Procedures for storage, management and responsible 
disposal of surplus small arms (principle 4); 
• Selection and training of law enforcement officials (principle 
5); 
• Special attention to human rights as part of that training, 
including the preference for alternative means to force 
(principle 6); 
 
39.  Commission on Human Rights Report, supra note 37, at 3. 
40.  Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (Sept. 7, 1990). 
41.  G.A. Res. 34/169, annex, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, at 186 (Dec. 17, 
1979). 
42.  Economic and Social Council Res. 1989/65, annex, at 52 (May 24, 1989). 
43.  Principles, supra note 37, at preambular ¶ 11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/8














• Prior operational planning to avoid use of armed force 
(principle 7); 
• Reiteration of necessity and proportionality criteria 
(principle 8); and 
• Minimum criteria for investigating allegations of misuse 
(principle 9). 
 
Part B of the Principles elaborates the States’ responsibilities to prevent 
the misuse of firearms by private actors, including civilians.  Principle 10 
encapsulates the basic steps States must take to comply with their due 
diligence obligation to reduce arms-related violence committed by private 
actors: 
 
In order to ensure the protection of human rights by preventing 
small arms violence by private actors, Governments shall 
incorporate into their national laws licensing requirements to 
prevent possession of arms by persons who are at risk of misusing 
them. Possession of small arms shall be authorized for specific 
purposes only; small arms shall be used strictly for the purpose for 
which they are authorized. Before issuing a licence Governments 
shall require training in proper use of small arms, and shall take into 
consideration, at a minimum, the following factors: age, mental 
fitness, requested purpose, prior criminal record, and prior acts of 
domestic violence. Governments shall require periodic renewal of 
licences.44  
 
Principle 10 incorporates several key provisions aimed at reducing 
civilian gun violence and maximizing human rights protections.  First, all 
civilians must gain and periodically renew licenses to possess firearms.  
Second, licensing of firearms must be for a specific stated purpose. 
Licensing provides a transparent and fair procedure for the government, on 
behalf of its citizens, to ensure that individuals who seek firearms have a 
stated reason for doing so.  Third, to gain a license to possess a firearm, an 
 
44.  Id. (Principle 10). 
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applicant should meet the minimum social requirements to ensure that 
they will not use the weapon to violate the rights of others.  
The framing of Principle 10 was based on the State responses to the 
Sub-Commission’s Questionnaire,45 and on standards suggested in several 
previous U.N. resolutions and reports to promote the safety and well-being 
of persons and to ensure freedom from fear of crime. The U.N. Economic 
and Social Council adopted resolution 1997/28 on firearm regulation for 
purposes of crime prevention and public health and safety. That resolution 
encouraged States to consider regulatory approaches to the civilian use of 
firearms including, “[a] licensing system, including the licensing of 
firearm businesses, to ensure that firearms are not distributed to persons 
convicted of serious crimes or other persons who are prohibited under the 
laws of the respective Member States from owning or possessing 
firearms.”46 In 1995, the report of the Ninth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders included the 
concern, “that the high incidence of crimes, accidents and suicides 
involving the use of firearms is closely related to the abundance of 
firearms in society without appropriate regulation of the possession and 
storage or training in their use and, inter alia, to the fact that the persons 
who are most likely to use them for criminal activities have easy access to 
them.”47 Similarly, a 1998 report of the U.N. Secretary-General on 
measures to regulate firearms summarized the findings of four regional 
workshops on issues involved in national legislation on firearm regulation 
and elaborated the elements for a declaration of principles, including the 
requirement that States take appropriate measures to regulate the civilian 
possession and use of firearms.48 Conditions discussed by participants at 
the workshops included age, necessity, training, criminal history, history 
of drug/alcohol abuse, mental fitness, physical fitness and spousal 
approval.49 The Secretary-General’s recommendations were tempered with 
 
45.  See discussion supra Part II. 
46.  Economic and Social Council Res. 1997/28, ¶ 5 (July 21, 1997). 
47.  Ninth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Report 
Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.169/16/Rev.1at 29 (May 8, 1995). 
48.  U.N. Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Reform and 
Strengthening of Legal Institutions: Measures to Regulate Firearms, U.N. Doc. E/CN/15/1998/4 at 9 
(Mar. 11, 1998). 
49.  Id. at 4-5. 
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language recognizing the sovereign rights of States to enact their own 
firearms regulations.50  
The remaining Principles on the prevention of human rights violations 
committed with small arms –Principles 11 through 14–consist of 
restatements in the human rights framework of measures established in 
other security instruments.  The Principles call for marking and tracing by 
manufacturers;51 investigation and criminal penalties for misuse of small 
arms;52 effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs 
in post-conflict situations, including the effective collection, control, 
storage, and destruction of small arms;53 and prohibition on international 
transfer when firearms are likely to be used to commit serious human 
rights violations.54  An additional Principle, proposed by the Jamaican 
member of the Sub-Commission, Ms. Florizelle O'Connor and endorsed 
by the Sub-Commission, requires the mutual exchange of information 
regarding gun ownership for the purposes of judicial proceedings in other 
States.55 
 
V. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE 
PREVENTION OF CIVILIAN FIREARM VIOLENCE 
 
A. Human Rights Council 
 
Since the completion of the Sub-Commission’s study, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council has increased its attention on the risks to 
human rights caused by the misuse of firearms by civilians.  The Council’s 
engagement with civilian firearm violence began in 2015, when the 
governments of Ecuador and Peru proposed a resolution authorizing a 
study on the best practices regarding regulation of civilian acquisition, 
 
50.  Id. at 10. (“Recognizing that States have developed different cultural and historical uses for 
firearms and that their sovereign rights to enact their own regulations on firearms should be respected, 
Member States should…take appropriate measures to regulate firearms, including those suggested in 
Economic and Social Council resolution 1997/28, paragraph 5.”). 
51.  Principles supra note 37 (Principle 11). 
52.  Id. (Principle 12). 
53.  Id. (Principle 13). 
54.  Id. (Principle 14). 
55.  Id. (Principle 15). 
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possession and use of firearms.  Besides Ecuador and Peru, the cosponsors 
of the resulting draft resolution56 included Cuba, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Switzerland, and Venezuela, a list that cast a distinctly geopolitical 
shadow on this initial effort. The lone Western State, Switzerland, had a 
long history of supporting research on gun violence, including its funding 
of Small Arms Survey, a research think tank.57 The United States 
Ambassador to the Human Rights Council explained the State’s abstention 
on the resolution, “[w]e do not believe that a state’s regulation of the 
purely domestic acquisition, possession, and use of firearms is an 
appropriate topic for international attention, generally, or the Human 
Rights Council, specifically. Further, we do not regard the domestic 
actions suggested by the resolution to be required by international human 
rights obligations.”58  Despite the U.S. concerns, the Council adopted the 
resolution that authorized the study by a vote of forty-one to zero, with six 
abstentions (France, Japan, Republic of Korea, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, United States of America).59   
The resulting study by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights discussed the impact of the misuse of firearms on the 
enjoyment of human rights and regulation of civilian access to firearms.60 
The High Commissioner concluded that the information it had received 
from States and other U.N. stakeholders “point[ed] to a correlation 
between civilian access to firearms, including lawfully acquired weapons, 
and levels of violence and insecurity, including in non-conflict settings.”61 
 
56.  See Human Rights Council Res. 29/10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/29/L.18 (June 29, 2015). 
57. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 18 (2018), available at 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/SAS-Annual-Report-2017.pdf; SMALL ARMS 
SURVEY, ANNUAL REPORT 2016 19 (2017), available at, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/M-files/SAS-Annual-Report-2016.pdf. 
58.  A/HRC/29/L.18 Vote Item: 3 - 43rd Meeting, 29th Regular Session Human Rights Council, 
UNITED NATIONS, (July 2, 2015), 
http://webtv.un.org/assets/rss/video3804186128001/watch/ahrc29l.18-vote-item3-43rd-meeting-29th-
regular-session-human-rights-council/4334049853001/?term=&lan=french#player. 
59.  Mothusi Bruch Rabasha (Vice-President and Rapporteur), Report of the Human Rights Council 
on its Twenty-ninth Session, ¶ 233, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/2 (Nov. 25, 2015). 
60.  U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and the Regulation of Civilian 
Acquisition, Possession and Use of Firearms, U.N. Doc A/HRC/32/21 (Apr. 15, 2016) [hereinafter 
Regulation of Firearms]. 
61.  Id. ¶ 51. 
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To address this problem, the report identified various measures to prevent 
firearms-related human rights violations, including laws and regulations to 
license, register, monitor and train persons or companies with access to 
firearms. The report recommended a licensing system to prevent persons 
with a prior criminal record, relevant restraining orders, or mental health 
conditions from gaining access to firearms.62   
The Human Rights Council’s most recent resolution on firearm 
violence, 38/10 of July 5, 2018,63 was adopted in the absence of the United 
States, which withdrew as a member of the body on June 19, 2018.64 
Perhaps because the United States was not present to lobby its allies, a 
much broader group of States sponsored the 2018 draft resolution65 and 
the Council adopted it on a voice vote. The Council’s resolution 38/10 was 
the most robust recognition to date of the human rights responsibilities of 
States to protect persons from firearms violations committed by non-state 
actors, calling upon all States to “do their utmost” to take appropriate 
legislative, administrative and other measures to regulate civilian 
acquisition, possession and use.66 The Human Rights Council recognized 
that civilian firearms-related violence and insecurity posed direct risks not 
just to life, but also to the entire spectrum of human rights, including “the 
rights to health, to education, to an adequate standard of living and social 
security and to the right to participate in public, political and cultural 
life.”67 The resolution called for a further study by the High Commissioner 
on civilian misuse of firearms “with a view to…the strengthening or 
developing of effective national regulation and to other possible measures 
taken by States.”68    
 
62.  Id. ¶ 54(b). 
63. Human Rights Council Res. 38/10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/38/L.14 (July 5, 2018). 
64.  Remarks on the UN Human Rights Council, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/06/283341.htm. 
65.  Australia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Chile, Cyprus, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Honduras, Liechtenstein, 
Peru, Paraguay, Philippines, Switzerland and Uruguay. 
66.  Regulation of Firearms, supra note 60, ¶ 3. 
67.  Id. ¶ 2. 
68.  Human Rights Council Res. 38/10, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc A/HRC/38/L.14 (July 5, 2018). 
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B. Human Rights Committee 
 
The Human Rights Committee is the body of independent experts that 
enforces the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.  The Committee examines the periodic reports of States 
Parties, issuing Concluding Observations about each reporting State’s 
laws, policies and practices in relation to its treaty obligations.69 In the 
course of these examinations, the Committee has addressed civilian 
acquisition, possession and misuse with regard to several states’ reports;70 
its most detailed concerns have been directed to the United States.71 
In its reviews of two of the United States’ reports, the Committee 
expressed its concerns about the problems of civilian gun violence. With 
regard to the United States’ initial report, in 1995, the Committee 
expressed its regret about “the easy availability of firearms to the public 
and the fact that federal and State legislation is not stringent enough in that 
connection to secure the protection and enjoyment of the right to life and 
security of the individual guaranteed under the Covenant.”72 
In 2014, Committee again expressed its concern about the level of gun 
violence in the United States and the disparate impacts of that type of 
violence on women, children and racial minorities.  The Committee made 
 
69.  U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights 
Committee, Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1), pp. 15-24 (May 2005), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf. 
70.  See Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Rep. of Yemen, ¶ 
16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/ C/YEM/CO/5 (Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Yemen Observations], (expressing 
concern about the existence of a large number of weapons in the possession of public and private 
actors throughout the country.); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth 
Periodic Rep. of the Philippines, 106th Session (Oct. 15 – Nov. 2, 2012), ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/PHL/CO/4 (Nov. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Philippines Observations], (expressing concern at the 
proliferation of private armies and vigilante groups and the large number of illegal firearms);, U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Initial Rep. of Angola, 107th Sess. (Mar. 11-
28, 2013), ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AGO/CO/1, (Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Angola Observations] 
(recommending the State consider reinforcing its legislation in order to combat illegal possession and 
use of small arms) (Apr. 29, 2013). 
71.  U.N. Secretary-General, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 40 
of the Covenant, United States of America, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (Apr. 7, 1995) 
[hereinafter 1995 U.S. Observations], Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth 
Periodic Rep. of the United States of America, 110th Sess. (Mar. 10-28, 2014), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 U.S. Observations]. 
72.  1995 U.S. Observations, supra note 71, ¶ 17. 
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the following set of recommendations:  
 
The State Party should take all necessary measures to abide by its 
obligation to effectively protect the right to life. In particular, it 
should: (a) Continue its efforts to effectively curb gun violence, 
including through the continued pursuit of legislation requiring 
background checks for all private firearm transfers, in order to 
prevent possession of arms by persons recognized as prohibited 
individuals under federal law, and ensure strict enforcement of the 
Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban of 1996 (the Lautenberg 
Amendment);[73] and (b) Review the Stand Your Ground laws to 
remove far-reaching immunity and ensure strict adherence to the 
principles of necessity and proportionality when using deadly force 
in self-defence.74 
 
The Committee’s recommendations to other States Parties to the 
Covenant provided some context for the globalized nature of civilian gun 
violence and illuminated the treaty body’s views of States Parties’ human 
right obligations to prevent that violence.  To address the problem of 
criminal violence of vigilante groups in the Philippines, the Committee 
recommended that the government establish a mechanism to disband and 
disarm all private armies, vigilante groups and ‘force multipliers,’75 and 
also increase efforts to reduce the number of illegal firearms.”76 Similarly, 
in post-conflict Angola, the Committee highlighted the insecurity caused 
by small arms remaining in civilian hands.77 The Committee expressed its 
regret that Angola “ha[d] not provided statistical data regarding the 
number of crimes committed involving small arms; investigations 
undertaken; prosecutions made; sanctions imposed on those responsible 
and measures taken to protect its population against insecurity caused by 
small arms.”78 It recommended that the Angolan government “strengthen 
 
73.  [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2018)]. 
74.  2014 U.S. Observations, supra note 71, ¶ 10. 
75.  Force multipliers is the name given to anti-crime volunteers in the Philippines. 
76.  Philippines Observations, supra note 70, ¶ 14. 
77.  Angola Observations supra note 70, ¶ 12.   
78.  Id. 
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measures to collect small arms held by the population and to reduce 
insecurity in its territory. It should further consider reinforcing its 
legislation in order to combat illegal possession and use of small arms.”79   
In reviewing the 2012 report of Yemen, the Human Rights Committee 
expressed its concern about “the existence of a large number of weapons 
in the possession of public and private actors throughout the country, and 
the lack of proper control over the stockpiling and distribution of such 
weapons.”80 The Committee recommended that Yemen “work with the 
international community to develop and implement an effective 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for non-State 
actors, including the collection, control, storage and destruction of 
unnecessary weapons.”81 
In addition to its recommendations in response to State reports, the 
Human Rights Committee has addressed threats to human rights from 
private armed violence in its general comments. The Committee’s most 
recent General Comment, number 36, interpreted Article 6 of the 
Covenant on the right to life.82 General comment 36 replaced the 
Committee’s 1982 comment, number 6,83 reflecting the many legal 
developments since the previous statement on the right to life.  
General comment 36 offered more guidance for States Parties to the 
Covenant on its obligations to address threats to life caused by civilian 
firearm violence. The new general comment explained the deepening 
jurisprudence on the due diligence obligations to ensure the right to life, 
stating that States Parties must “exercise due diligence to protect the lives 
of individuals against deprivations caused by persons or entities, whose 
conduct is not attributable to the State.”84 The Committee explained, “The 
duty to protect the right to life by law also includes an obligation for States 
parties to adopt any appropriate laws or other measures in order to protect 
life from all reasonably foreseeable threats, including from threats 
 
79.  Id. 
80.  Yemen Observations, supra note 70. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, (Oct. 30, 
2018). 
83.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
84.  Human Rights Comm., supra note 82, ¶ 7. 
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emanating from private persons and entities.”85 
 The General Comment applied the due-diligence obligation 
specifically to armed violence, explaining that States Parties are obligated 
to “undertake reasonable positive measures, which do not impose on them 
disproportionate burdens, in response to reasonably foreseeable threats to 
life originating from private persons and entities, whose conduct is not 
attributable to the State.”86 Specifically, the comment provided “States 
parties should also disband irregular armed groups… and reduce the 




This article demonstrates that the United Nations’ human rights bodies 
are engaging in an increasingly robust discussion about the human rights 
risks of firearm violence. That discussion is likely to lead to the 
elaboration of minimum international standards to prevent gun-related 
violations, including those committed by private actors. The Sub-
Commission’s Principles provide an excellent baseline for delineating the 
State’s obligations to prevent rights violations committed with firearms, 
based on jurisprudence regarding due diligence and reported State 
practice.   
Since the Sub-Commission’s endorsement of the Principles in 2006, 
the deepening jurisprudence in international human rights bodies has 
further reinforced the positive responsibilities of States to exercise due 
diligence to protect the lives of persons against deprivations caused by 
private persons or entities. The Human Rights Committee’s General 
Comment 36 and its Concluding Observations clarify the obligation of 
States to avoid reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening 
situations that can result in loss of life. Unregulated civilian possession of 
firearms constitutes such a reasonably foreseeable threat and the 
Committee has thus called for effective licensing of civilians seeking to 
 
85.  Id. ¶ 18. 
86.  Id. ¶ 21. 
87.  Id. ¶ 21. (first citing Angola Observations, supra note 70; then citing 2014 U.S. Observations, 
supra note 71). 
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acquire firearms in its human rights reviews. 
The Human Rights Council has also spoken clearly on this issue, 
calling for States to regulate civilian acquisition, possession and use of 
firearms, based on the recognition that civilian firearms-related violence 
and insecurity pose direct risks, not only to the right to life, security of 
person and physical integrity, but to the entire spectrum of human rights. 
There is an emerging global consensus and common practice regarding the 
minimum regulations needed to prevent civilian firearms-related violence. 
The Sub-Commission’s study demonstrated more than a decade ago that 
all States—including the United States—had at least some regulations in 
place to keep firearms out of the hands of those likely to misuse them. The 
challenge now is to articulate those minimum standards clearly as 
universal human rights obligations, and not just to leave them to other 
international sectors, such as security or crime prevention, to address. 
As a matter of human rights law, then, the Human Rights Council must 
speak to the basic minimum standards for licensing civilian possession of 
firearms. The standards should establish common licensing criteria based 
on established State practice, limiting acquisition based, at a minimum, 
age, criminal record, mental fitness, requested purpose, and prior acts of 
domestic violence. A clear statement of principles by the international 
human rights community for preventing civilian gun violence would 
represent a collective commitment to end the devastating impacts of 
firearm violence and would assert the primacy of human rights in the 
global politics that surround this issue.    
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